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The potential domestic impact of rapidly increasing foreign activity by US multinational firms is a source of widespread concern. In particular, flows 
of foreign direct investment (FDI) to rapidly growing foreign markets generate 
fears that such investment displaces domestic employment, capital investment, and 
tax revenue. An alternative perspective suggests that growing foreign investment 
may increase levels of domestic activity by improving a firm’s profitability and 
competitiveness. Despite the absence of strong empirical evidence resolving this 
question, many US policy makers are anxious to address the perceived problem 
of offshoring.
The effect of increased foreign activity by US multinational firms on their 
own domestic operations turns on production and cost considerations that might 
take several forms.1 A multinational firm’s total worldwide production level 
could be approximately fixed, being determined by resource limits, capacity 
constraints, or market competition. This would imply that foreign and domestic 
factors of production are conditional substitutes and that any additional foreign 
production then reduces domestic production. Alternatively, the level of total 
production might not be fixed but, instead, responsive to profit opportunities 
that are influenced by economic growth rates. Increases in FDI may then raise 
1 The text uses “domestic” to refer to the US activities of US multinational firms, and “foreign” to refer to the 
non-US activities of the same companies. 
* Desai: Harvard Business School, Baker 265, Soldiers Field, Boston, MA 02163 (e-mail: mdesai@hbs.edu); 
Foley:  Harvard Business School, Baker 235, Soldiers Field, Boston, MA 02163 (e-mail: ffoley@hbs.edu); Hines: 
Department of Economics, University of Michigan, 611 Tappan Street, Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1220 (e-mail: 
jrhines@umich.edu).
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Domestic Effects of the Foreign Activities of  
US Multinationals†
By Mihir A. Desai, C. Fritz Foley, and James R. Hines Jr.*
Do firms investing abroad simultaneously reduce their domestic 
activity? This paper analyzes the relationship between the domestic 
and foreign operations of US manufacturing firms between 1982 and 
2004 by instrumenting for changes in foreign operations with GDP 
growth rates of the foreign countries in which they invest. Estimates 
produced using this instrument indicate that 10 percent greater 
foreign investment is associated with 2.6 percent greater domestic 
investment, and 10 percent greater foreign employee compensation 
is associated with 3.7 percent greater domestic employee compensa-
tion. These results do not support the popular notion that expan-
sions abroad reduce a firm’s domestic activity, instead suggesting 
the opposite. (JEL F23, H25, L25)
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the return to domestic production, stimulating domestic factor demand and 
domestic output. Firms might, for example, find that foreign operations provide 
valuable intermediate inputs at low cost, or that foreign affiliates are ready buy-
ers of tangible and intangible property produced in the United States.
This paper evaluates the extent to which increased foreign activity by US manufac-
turing firms influenced their domestic activities between 1982 and 2004. This exercise 
employs confidential affiliate-level information on the activities of US manufacturing 
firms collected by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). These data permit indi-
vidual foreign operations to be matched to the domestic activities of the same firms. 
As a result, it is possible to measure the extent to which expansions in foreign business 
activity coincide with changes in domestic activity. The evidence indicates that there 
is a strong positive correlation between the domestic and foreign activity levels of 
multinational firms.
As foreign and domestic operations are jointly determined, this evidence can be 
difficult to interpret. For example, the discovery of a new drug by a pharmaceuti-
cal company may increase its activity both abroad and at home. Alternatively, real 
exchange rate movements may make it more profitable for a US firm to produce 
in foreign locations and less profitable to produce in the United States, thereby 
encouraging the firm to expand its foreign activities while reducing its domestic 
activities, even though the foreign and domestic activities are unrelated. Without 
exogenous variation in foreign activities, it is difficult to know how they affect 
domestic activities.
Foreign economic growth rates offer a potential source of exogenous variation 
in foreign activity levels. Since foreign investment locations differ significantly 
between firms, it is possible to construct firm-specific weighted averages of for-
eign gross domestic product (GDP) growth. These firm-specific foreign economic 
growth rates can be used to generate predicted growth rates of foreign activity that 
are employed to explain changes in domestic activity. This procedure compares 
two US firms, one whose foreign investments in 1982 were, for example, concen-
trated in Britain, and another whose foreign investments were concentrated in 
France. As the British economy grew more rapidly than the French economy, the 
firm with British operations should exhibit more rapid growth of foreign invest-
ment than would the firm with French operations. If the domestic activities of the 
firm with British operations grow at different rates than the domestic activities of 
the firm with French operations, it may be appropriate to interpret the difference 
as reflecting the impact of changes in foreign operations.
Weighted foreign economic growth rates are strong predictors of subsequent for-
eign investment by US firms, including investment in affiliates that primarily export 
their output. It appears that foreign economic growth rates do not merely capture 
changes in host-country demand for foreign output but also changes in real foreign 
input costs due to factor supplies, productivity, and new opportunities.
Second stage equations based on predictions that use foreign economic growth 
rates to instrument for changes in foreign activity imply that 10 percent greater 
foreign capital investment triggers 2.6 percent additional domestic capital invest-
ment, and that 10 percent greater foreign employee compensation is associated 
with 3.7 percent greater domestic employee compensation. There are similar 
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 positive relationships between foreign and domestic changes in assets and num-
bers of employees.2
There are several channels through which foreign activities influence the scope 
of domestic operations, including cases in which foreign production requires inputs 
of tangible or intellectual property produced in the home country. The same instru-
mental variables method used to identify the effect of foreign investment on domes-
tic investment indicates that greater foreign activity is associated with higher exports 
from US parent companies to their foreign affiliates and with greater domestic 
research and development (R&D) spending.
The positive association between changes in foreign and domestic activities per-
sists in supplemental specifications designed to address alternative interpretations of 
the main results. The use of weighted foreign economic growth rates as instruments 
for changes in foreign investment has the potential to produce misleading results if 
the foreign investments of firms planning rapid expansion of domestic investment 
are disproportionately attracted to economies expected to grow rapidly. To address 
this possibility, the residuals from regressing foreign GDP growth against lagged 
GDP growth can be used instead of actual GDP growth to explain foreign invest-
ment. This substitution produces very similar results.
In order to avoid the possibility that industry-specific shocks might produce a cor-
relation of foreign and domestic investment growth rates, the regressions reported 
in this paper include fixed effects for each two-digit parent industry in each year. 
Furthermore, the use of a larger set of year-specific three-digit industry fixed effects 
does not change the results. Alternatively, if firms export to unaffiliated customers 
located in the same countries in which they invest, foreign economic growth rates 
might directly stimulate export-oriented domestic activity. This can be controlled 
for by including an additional variable equal to export-weighted foreign economic 
growth, which, again, does not alter the results. Finally, there are circumstances in 
which real exchange rate movements that are correlated with economic growth rates 
might independently influence both foreign and domestic activity, but replicating 
the analysis with controls for firm-specific changes in foreign exchange rates yields 
similar answers.
These results carry implications for US policies that influence the attractiveness of 
foreign investment to US firms. There is a great deal of recent political concern that 
greater foreign business activity, whatever its source, comes at the cost of reduced 
domestic activity. This viewpoint is responsible for a number of actual and proposed 
government policies. For example, recent proposals requiring US firms to abide by 
US labor and regulatory standards when operating abroad would increase the cost 
of certain foreign activities in the hope of making domestic operations more com-
petitive. Those who advocate greater US taxation of active foreign business income 
often do so in the belief that subjecting foreign business income to high rates of 
2 The example of one large US multinational firm illustrates the relationships manifested in the large-sample 
evidence. Between 2000 and 2006, Caterpillar increased its foreign employment by 49 percent so that foreign 
employment constituted half of its total global employment. Over this period, Caterpillar’s US exports, a fraction 
of which were sent to its foreign affiliates, grew by 104 percent, and its US employment grew by 29 percent. While 
it is difficult to draw causal inferences from the experiences of individual companies, the econometric evidence 
suggests that Caterpillar’s experience is typical of US firms during this period. 
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tax will stimulate demand for domestic factors of production. While plausible, and 
perhaps intuitive, the premise motivating these policies appears to be inconsistent 
with the evidence presented in this paper. This, in turn, suggests that the conceptual 
framework used to evaluate policies might be due for revision, as discussed in the 
context of tax policy by Desai and Hines (2003).
Previous studies report mixed results in analyzing the impact of foreign operations 
on domestic economic activity. Robert E. Lipsey (1995) analyzes a cross-section of US 
multinational firms, reporting a mild positive correlation between foreign production 
and domestic employment levels. Guy V. G. Stevens and Lipsey (1992) analyze the 
investment behavior of seven multinational firms, concluding that investments in dif-
ferent locations substitute for each other due to costly external financing. The absence 
of compelling instruments that satisfy the necessary exclusion restrictions complicate 
the interpretation of this evidence, a problem that likewise appears in studies of aggre-
gate FDI and domestic investment. Martin S. Feldstein (1995) analyzes decade-long 
averages of aggregate FDI and domestic investment in OECD economies, reporting 
evidence that direct investment abroad reduces domestic investment levels. Michael 
P. Devereux and Harold Freeman (1995) come to a different conclusion in their study 
of bilateral flows of aggregate investment funds between seven OECD countries, 
finding no evidence of tax-induced substitution between domestic and foreign invest-
ment. Desai, Foley, and Hines (2005a) report time series evidence that foreign and 
domestic investment are positively correlated for US firms. Aggregate evidence for 
Australia (Isabel Faeth 2006), firm (Jörn Kleinert and Farid Toubal, 2007) and indus-
try-level (Christian Arndt, Claudia M. Buch, and Monika Schnitzer 2007) evidence for 
Germany, and industry-level evidence for Canada (Walid Hejazi and P. Pauly 2003) 
likewise points to positive correlations between changes in foreign and domestic activ-
ity. Bruce A. Blonigen (2001) investigates the related question of whether foreign pro-
duction by multinationals is a substitute or complement for exports, finding evidence 
for both effects. The effect of foreign operations on the domestic activities of multina-
tional firms therefore remains an open question.3
Much of the recent theoretical and empirical work on multinational firms empha-
sizes alternative motivations for foreign direct investment4 or the reasons why 
alternative productive arrangements5 are employed.  Specifically, David Hummels, 
Jun Ishii, and Kei-Mu Yi (2001); Yi (2003); and Gordon H. Hanson, Raymond J. 
Mataloni Jr., and Matthew J. Slaughter (2005) emphasize the importance of  vertical 
 specialization to international trade patterns and the expansion strategies of multi-
national firms. The findings of this research, that multinational firms exhibit high 
3 Several studies, including S. Lael Brainard and David A. Riker (1997), Riker and Brainard (1997), Matthew 
J. Slaughter (2000), Robert C. Feenstra and Gordon H. Hanson (1996, 1999), and Ann E. Harrison and Margaret 
S. McMillan (2004) emphasize the link between foreign activities and domestic wages and employment. 
Additionally, Blonigen and Wesley W. Wilson (1999) investigate the role of demand by multinational firms in 
determining variations in the measured substitutability of foreign and domestic goods.
4 Investments are often characterized as being vertical or horizontal. The horizontal FDI view represents 
FDI as the replication of capacity in multiple locations in response to factors such as trade costs, as in James R. 
Markusen (1984, 2002). The vertical FDI view represents FDI as the geographic distribution of production glob-
ally in response to the opportunities afforded by different markets, as in Elhanan Helpman (1984).
5 Pol Antràs (2003); Antràs and Helpman (2004); Desai, Foley and Hines (2004); Helpman, Mark J. Melitz, 
and Stephen R. Yeaple (2004); and Feenstra and Hanson (2005) analyze the determinants of alternative foreign 
production arrangements. 
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degrees of integrated production, are consistent with sizeable positive effects of for-
eign operations on domestic activity.
Section I of the paper sketches a simple framework for the analysis of growth-driven 
FDI on the domestic operations of multinational firms. Section II describes the avail-
able data on US direct investment abroad. Section III presents empirical evidence of 
the determinants of foreign investment levels by US firms and the impact of foreign 
investment on economic activity in the United States. Section IV is the conclusion.
I. Foreign Economic Growth and the Operations of Multinational Firms
The first stages of the regressions that follow use the fact that firms differ in their 
initial distributions of foreign economic activity to predict different growth rates 
of subsequent activity, based on differences in the average GDP growth rates of 
the countries in which their activities were initially concentrated. These predicted 
growth rates then become the independent variables in second stage-equations used 
to explain changes in domestic business operations. This empirical strategy takes a 
firm’s initial distribution of activity among foreign countries to be exogenous from 
the standpoint of subsequent changes in domestic business activity. In order to con-
sider the merits of this strategy, it is useful to formalize the way in which foreign 
economic growth influences domestic and foreign investment through production 
considerations and demand conditions.
Consider a multinational firm that produces output with a production function 
Q(k, k*), in which k represents inputs of domestic factors and k* represents inputs 
of foreign factors; output is taken to be a concave function of each of these inputs. 
The firm faces costs of c per unit of k and c* per unit of k*. Revenue is given by 
r(Q, y*) (the usual demand properties imply that ∂r/∂Q > 0 and ∂2r/∂Q2 ≤ 02 , and 
y* denotes foreign economic conditions. r is a function of y* only insofar as foreign 
economic conditions affect sales revenue for a given output level, presumably by 
affecting the prices that output can command in local foreign markets.
The firm maximizes r(Q, y*) − (ck + c*k*), and the first order conditions for profit 
maximization are:
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In this setting, a change in foreign costs 1c*2 affects domestic economic activity by 
influencing k*, which, in turn, affects ∂Q/∂k. This can be seen by totally differen-
tiating (1), denoting the induced change in foreign inputs by dk*, and the resulting 
change in domestic inputs by dk:




   ∂
2r ____
∂Q2
  c ∂Q ___
∂k
  dk +  ∂Q ___
∂k*
 dk*d +  ∂r ___
∂Q









 +  ∂Q ___
∂k
   ∂
2r _____ 
∂Q∂y*
 dy* = dc.
186 AmEricAn Economic JoUrnAL: Economic PoLicy FEBrUAry 2009
Since dc = 0, equation (3) implies that
(4)  dk =  
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Since ∂2r/∂Q2 ≤ 0 and ∂2Q/∂k2 < 0, it follows that the denominator of the right side 
of equation (4) is positive.
The first term in the numerator of equation (4) is positive only if ∂2Q/∂k∂k* > 0 
and is of sufficient magnitude to offset the negative sign of the term that includes 
∂2r/∂Q2. This will be the case if foreign and domestic inputs exhibit significant 
complementarity in production. The second term in the numerator of equation (4) is 
a demand effect. If ∂r/∂Q increases with y*, then higher values of y* will be asso-
ciated with increased demand for k. This reflects the possibility that the change in 
foreign economic conditions also directly affects ∂r/∂Q by influencing final output 
demand, as captured by ∂2r/∂Q∂y*. If foreign affiliates or parent companies sell 
significant portions of their output in markets where affiliates are located, and local 
demand influences the prices that output commands, then if y* is per capita income 
in countries where affiliates are located, it may be the case that ∂2r/∂Q∂y* > 0. As 
such, the two terms in the numerator of equation (4) reveal that foreign economic 
growth can influence domestic factor demand through production and demand 
considerations.
Equation (4) suggests that it is possible to estimate the impact of foreign input 
changes on domestic factor demands by using changes to foreign economic con-
ditions as instruments. From equation (2), it is clear that reduced values of c* are 
associated with higher levels of k*. Real values of c* are difficult to observe, but to 
the extent that national economic growth is associated with productivity gains that 
correspond to declining real input costs, changes in foreign income levels can serve 
as y* and therefore proxies for changes in c*. For example, a shock to foreign technol-
ogy might reduce real foreign factor costs and simultaneously promote foreign GDP 
growth. In such a case, the change in foreign GDP can be used to predict changes in 
foreign factor demand by US firms.
The second term in the numerator of equation (4) is a reminder that changes in 
foreign income have the potential to affect the demand for domestic factors via out-
put demand effects. In particular, it is possible that ∂r/∂Q is, itself, a function of y*, 
since firms with foreign operations concentrated in rapidly growing countries may 
find that foreign demand for their output grows faster than do firms without strong 
presences in hot foreign markets. If ∂r/∂Q is an increasing function of y*, then a 
change in y* will be positively correlated with changes in domestic factor demands 
even if there is no production spillover, that is, even if ∂2Q/∂k∂k* = 0. Since some 
of the policy questions raised by these demand effects differ from those triggered by 
production effects, it is useful to consider the importance of the demand channel.
How might one distinguish production effects from demand effects in estimat-
ing the impact of foreign GDP growth on domestic factor demands? One method of 
VoL. 1 no. 1 187DESAi ET AL.: DomESTic EFFEcTS oF FDi
doing so is to distinguish firms based on the extent to which their sales are likely to 
be influenced by conditions in foreign markets. Firms whose foreign affiliates sell 
relatively little in their host markets may be affected by local income growth, but 
these effects are likely to reflect changes in real factor costs rather than new sell-
ing opportunities. If the second term in the numerator of equation (4) is plausibly 
zero for such firms, then one is left with production effects being responsible for the 
impact of foreign income growth on domestic factor demands. The evidence ana-
lyzed below is indeed consistent with this interpretation.
The possibility that foreign GDP growth influences foreign factor use because it 
is correlated with sales by foreign affiliates is an issue for the interpretation of the 
instrument, not its validity. In order to serve as a valid instrument, it is necessary 
that the average GDP growth rate of foreign countries in which a firm invests is 
conditionally uncorrelated with the residual in the second stage equation explaining 
the firm’s domestic economic activity. This condition requires that foreign economic 
growth affects its domestic operations only by influencing the level and character 
of its foreign operations. This restriction cannot be directly tested, but reasonable 
specifications of production processes within multinational firms imply that the 
most likely channel by which foreign economic prosperity affects firms with local 
operations is by affecting local operations.
While the preceding explanation establishes how foreign economic growth can 
give rise to production and demand effects, it also offers guidance on the validity of 
the instrument. There are three important scenarios in which the instrument would 
be invalid, and each is considered in the empirical tests below. First, specific indus-
trial activity might be concentrated in certain countries, and domestic and foreign 
operations might experience common shocks. For example, if most of the foreign 
operations of electronic component manufacturing parents were located in Taiwan, 
a productivity shock to the industry could be associated with high growth in Taiwan 
while the productivity shock also has a direct effect on the growth of parent firms in 
the industry. The resulting possible misattribution of cause and effect can be largely 
prevented by including fixed effects that are specific to individual industries and time 
periods. Second, firms might export to unaffiliated customers in the same foreign 
countries in which they invest, in which case foreign economic growth might stimu-
late exports and thereby domestic operations directly. This consideration suggests 
that it is useful to control for export-driven changes in domestic activity by including 
an independent variable equal to export-weighted foreign economic growth. Third, 
parent firms that are trying to grow quickly may invest in countries where econo-
mies are expected to grow rapidly in the future. This scenario implies that only the 
unanticipated component of foreign economic growth would be a valid instrument.
Finally, it is also possible that foreign investment by US firms affects local GDP 
growth rates, making foreign GDP growth rates inadmissible as instruments in 
explaining foreign investment. This effect is likely to be very small in magnitude 
except for a certain number of small countries, principally tax havens, that draw 
disproportionate volumes of US investment.6 Since the empirical work  presented in 
6 For an analysis of the effect of foreign direct investment on the GDP growth rates of small tax havens, see 
Hines (2005).
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the paper uses average foreign GDP growth rates weighted by investment levels, this 
consideration is unlikely to contaminate the estimated results.
II. Data and Descriptive Statistics
The empirical work presented in Section III is based on the most comprehensive 
and reliable available data on the activities of US multinational firms. The BEA 
Benchmark Surveys of US Direct Investment Abroad in 1982, 1989, 1994, 1999, 
and 2004 provide a panel of data on the financial and operating characteristics of 
US multinational firms.7 In order to limit the heterogeneity of the sample, observa-
tions are restricted to US firms with parent companies in manufacturing industries 
(as defined in the BEA survey using a classification that corresponds almost exactly 
to SIC codes 20–39).8 In each of the four benchmark years, all affiliates with sales, 
assets, or net income in excess of certain size cutoffs of no more than $10 million in 
absolute value, and their parent companies, were required to file reports. Measures 
of aggregate foreign activity of individual firms are obtained by summing measures 
of activity across the firm’s foreign affiliates. The surveys collect sufficient informa-
tion to quantify domestic and foreign sales, assets, net property, plant and equip-
ment, employment compensation, and employment, as well as R&D spending by the 
parent company and exports from the parent company to affiliates.9
The BEA collects identifiers linking the parent company and affiliates through 
time, thereby permitting the calculation of changes in domestic and foreign input 
use. Growth rates are computed as ratios of changes in activity between benchmark 
years to averages of beginning and ending period levels of activity. 10 Since the data 
include five benchmark survey years (1982, 1989, 1994, 1999, and 2004) it is pos-
sible to calculate changes in this normalized measure for at most four periods. As 
the analysis considers only changes, observations of firms that initiate or termi-
nate global activities between benchmark years are not part of the analysis for that 
period.11
Table 1 presents means, medians, and standard deviations of variables used in 
the regressions that follow. The instrumental variables procedure uses foreign GDP 
7 The International Investment and Trade in Services Survey Act governs the collection of the data and ensures 
that “use of an individual company’s data for tax, investigative, or regulatory purposes is prohibited.” Willful non-
compliance with the Act can result in penalties of up to $10,000 or a prison term of one year. As a result of these 
assurances and penalties, BEA believes that coverage is close to complete and levels of accuracy are high.
8 Manufacturing firms have 56 percent of the employee compensation and 56 percent of the property, plant, 
and equipment of all US multinational firms in the BEA data for these years.
9 Only a limited number of firms reported US exports from parents to affiliates in 2004 due to a change in 
reporting requirements. Therefore, the sample used analyzed intercompany exports and does not include observa-
tions for 2004.
10 Construction of growth rates around averages of start and end of period values has become standard proce-
dure in the analysis of firm-level job flows, as in Steven J. Davis, John C. Faberman, and John Haltiwanger (2006). 
Leo Törnqvist, Pentti Vartia, and Yrjö O. Vartia (1985) and the appendix to Davis, Haltiwanger, and Scott Schuh 
(1996) compare the properties of this growth rate measure to alternatives including log changes and growth rates 
calculated relative to initial values.
11 The change in foreign activity attributable to the growth of surviving parent companies is considerably 
larger than the change due to net entry and exit of parent companies in each of the four periods covered by the 
data. Appendix table 1 of Desai, Foley, and Hines (2005b) provides a description of changes in net foreign prop-
erty, plant and equipment investment of US multinationals, decomposing these changes into the growth of surviv-
ing firms, entry by new firms, and capital reductions due to exit by firms that were previously part of the sample.
VoL. 1 no. 1 189DESAi ET AL.: DomESTic EFFEcTS oF FDi
growth rates, which are calculated by dividing changes (between benchmark years) 
in the GDP per capita of affiliate host countries by the average of beginning and 
ending period values.12 These country growth rates are aggregated using weights 
equal to a firm’s beginning of period affiliate net property, and plant and equip-
ment in each country. To control for the possibility that GDP growth rates affect 
domestic levels of activity by influencing parent company exports to final consum-
ers abroad, some regressions include, as an independent variable, GDP growth rates 
weighted by a parent company’s beginning of period exports to unrelated parties. 
Some regressions also include changes in real exchange rates, which are computed 
using nominal exchange rates taken from Heston, Summers, and Aten (2006) and 
measures of inflation from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics database. 
The real exchange rate movement is defined to equal the ratio of the change in the 
dollar-equivalent real exchange rate to the average of this rate at the beginning and 
end of period. Firm-specific exchange rate changes equal the product of these real 
exchange rate changes and weights equal to beginning of period affiliate net prop-
erty plant and equipment in each country.
12 Per capita gross domestic product is the CGDP variable reported by Alan Heston, Robert Summers, and 
Bettina Aten (2006) representing incomes adjusted for purchasing power and reported in current dollars.




Foreign affiliate net PPE growth 0.3127 0.3313 0.8245 
Foreign affiliate asset growth 0.4071 0.4275 0.7073 
Foreign affiliate employment compensation growth 0.3191 0.3467 0.7336 
Foreign affiliate employment growth 0.1141 0.1088 0.7366 
Parent weighted GDP growth rate 0.2368 0.2091 0.1036 
Share of sales abroad 0.3237 0.2579 0.2998 
Domestic net PPE growth 0.1295 0.0952 0.8995 
Domestic asset growth 0.3121 0.3078 0.5330 
Domestic employment compensation growth 0.2164 0.2377 0.5066 
Domestic employment growth 20.0030 0.0005 0.4837 
Parent R&D growth 0.1922 0.2945 0.9320 
Growth of parent exports to affiliates 0.2664 0.4013 1.0464 
GDP growth weighted by parent trade 0.2329 0.2093 0.0962 
Change in real exchange rate 20.1229 20.0807 0.2565 
notes: Growth rates of net property, plant and equipment (PPE), assets, employment compensation, and employ-
ment are computed as the ratio of the change in activity between benchmark years to the average of beginning 
and ending year levels of activity. Parent weighted GDP growth rate is the weighted change, over benchmark peri-
ods, in the GDP per capita of affiliate host coutries, divided by the average of beginning and ending period val-
ues. Values of real GDP per capita in current prices are taken from Heston, Summers, and Aten (2006). Country 
weights used for each parent company equal beginning of period net PPE levels in each country. Share of sales 
abroad is measured as of the beginning of each period, and is computed by aggregating sales by each affiliate to 
persons outside of the affiliate’s host country and dividing by total affiliate sales. Growth rates of parent company 
R&D and parent company exports to affiliates are ratios of changes between benchmark years to average values 
of these measures at the beginning and end of the period. GDP Growth Weighted by Parent Trade is calculated 
using weights drawn from the distribution of beginning of period parent exports. Changes in real exchange rates 
are weighted changes. A change is measured as the ratio of the change of the real exchange rate to the average 
of the real exchanges rates at the beginning and end of the period. The weights correspond to the distribution of 
beginning of period PPE. Real exchange rates are calculated using nominal exchange rates reported in Heston, 
Summers, and Aten (2006) and measures of inflation from the IMF International Financial Statistics database.
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company level.14 The 0.2018 coefficient reported in column one of Table 2 indicates 
that 10 percent higher foreign net property, and plant and equipment growth, is asso-
ciated with 2 percent higher domestic net property, and plant and equipment growth 
by parent companies. Asset accumulation displays a similar pattern, the 0.3241 coef-
ficient reported in column 2 implying that 10 percent foreign asset growth is associ-
ated with 3.2 percent domestic asset growth. The regressions reported in columns 3 
and 4 consider changes in labor demand. The 0.2454 coefficient reported in column 
3 indicates that 10 percent higher foreign employment compensation is associated 
with a 2.5 percent greater domestic employment compensation. And the 0.2263 
coefficient reported in column 4 similarly implies that 10 percent higher numbers 
of foreign employees is associated with 2.3 percent higher numbers of domestic 
employees. Across all of these measures of multinational firm activity, the OLS 
analysis suggests that increased foreign activity is associated with greater domestic 
activity.
B. instrumental Variables Specifications
The instrumental variables approach outlined above relies on the ability of for-
eign economic growth rates to explain changes in foreign activity levels of US mul-
tinational firms. Table 3 presents the results of regressions of growth rates of foreign 
14 Information is missing for some firms in certain years, which is why sample sizes vary between specifica-
tions in Table 2.
Table 2—Changes in Foreign and Domestic Inputs: OLS Specifications 
Dependent variable:











(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant 20.3257 20.1270 20.3041 0.0565 
(0.5472) (0.1254) (0.4059) (0.1099) 
Foreign net PPE growth 0.2018
(0.0151)
Foreign asset growth 0.3241
 (0.0153)
 
Foreign employment  





Period/industry fixed effects? Y Y Y Y 
Observations 2,968 3,316 2,978 2,968 
r2 0.6893 0.3001 0.1904 0.1882 
notes: The dependent variables are domestic growth rates of net property, plant and equipment (PPE) (col-
umn 1), assets (column 2), employment compensation (column 3), and employment (column 4). Domestic and 
foreign growth rates are ratios of changes in activity between benchmark years to averages of the beginning 
and end of period values. All regressions are OLS specifications that include period/industry fixed effects. 
Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors that correct for clustering at the parent level appear in parentheses. 
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activity on firm-specific weighted averages of foreign economic growth rates, the 
weights corresponding to beginning of period distributions of foreign property, 
and plant and equipment. Growth rates are defined as in Table 2. All specifications 
include period-industry fixed effects, and the standard errors correct for clustering 
at the parent company level.
The results indicate that the economic performance of foreign economies signifi-
cantly influences the foreign activity of US multinational firms. The 1.4755 coef-
ficient reported in column 1 indicates that 2 percent faster annual average GDP 
growth in countries in which a firm invests is associated with 3 percent faster growth 
of affiliate net property, plant and equipment. Similar results appear in the regres-
sions reported in columns 2–4, in which coefficients imply that 2 percent faster 
annual GDP growth is associated with 2.3 percent greater foreign asset accumula-
tion, 2.3 percent greater foreign employee compensation growth, and 1.3 percent 
greater foreign employment growth.
As discussed above, foreign economic growth is associated with greater levels 
of foreign activity by US firms either because economic growth increases the value 
of the foreign output of US firms or because foreign economic growth coincides 
with reduced real input costs due to productivity gains or other changes. In order to 
consider these distinct channels, it is useful to identify the impact of foreign GDP 
growth on export sales by foreign affiliates, as such sales presumably are little, if at 
all, affected by output demand in the affiliates’ host countries. Such an exploration 
addresses concerns that the instrumental variables analysis is only relevant for cer-
tain types of foreign investments, for example, those that serve local markets.
Table 4 builds on the regressions reported in Table 3 by adding a variable equal 
to the average fraction of affiliate sales directed outside their own home markets. 
Table 3— Foreign GDP Growth and Changes in Foreign Input Use
Dependent variable:











(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant –0.4615 –0.2567 –0.5229 0.0224 
(0.1203) (0.0986) (0.0577) (0.5342) 
Parent weighted 1.4755 1.1723 1.1402 0.6746 
 GDP growth rate (0.2888) (0.2368) (0.2711) (0.2536) 
Period/industry  
 fixed effects?
Y Y Y Y 
Observations 2,844 3,137 2,842 2,834 
r2 0.0720 0.0897 0.0715 0.0478 
notes: The dependent variables are foreign growth rates of net property, plant and equipment (PPE) (column 1), 
assets (column 2), employment compensation (column 3), and employment (column 4). Foreign growth rates are 
ratios of changes in activity between benchmark years to averages of the beginning and end of period values. 
Parent weighted GDP growth rates are the weighted changes between benchmark periods, in GDP per capita of 
affiliate host countries, divided by averages of beginning and end of period values. Values of real GDP per capita 
in current prices are taken from Heston, Summers, and Aten (2006).  Country weights used for each parent com-
pany equal beginning of period net PPE levels in each country. All regressions are OLS specifications that include 
period/industry fixed effects. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors that correct for clustering at the par-
ent level appear in parentheses. 
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This variable is measured as of the beginning of the period. The interaction of this 
variable and weighted GDP growth indicates whether parent companies for which 
affiliates sell their output outside their host markets are more or less sensitive than 
others to changes in foreign economic growth rates. There are two notable features 
of the results presented in this table. First, and perhaps not surprising, the coefficient 
on the uninteracted GDP growth variable is positive and significant in all of the 
specifications other than that explaining foreign employment growth. This implies 
that capital investment and labor demand by firms for which affiliates do not export 
respond positively to foreign GDP growth, which is consistent either with cost or 
demand effects of foreign economic conditions. Second, and more telling, the esti-
mated coefficients on the interaction term are positive in all four equations, albeit not 
statistically significant, suggesting that there is no indication that the foreign opera-
tions of firms whose affiliates sell predominantly to host country markets are the 
most sensitive to foreign economic conditions. If anything, the reverse may be true. 
As such, it appears that cost considerations are important mechanisms by which 
foreign economic growth influences foreign factor demand.
Table 5 presents estimated coefficients from instrumental variables regressions in 
which predicted values of changes in foreign activity (based on coefficients drawn 
from the regressions presented in Table 3) are used to explain changes in domestic 
Table 4—Foreign GDP Growth and Changes in Foreign Input Use: Further Evidence 
Dependent variable:











(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant –0.3462 0.1192 0.1257 0.0700 
(0.1492) (0.1149) (0.1419) (0.5540) 
Parent weighted GDP 1.1986 0.9130 0.9274 0.5280 
 growth rate (0.3583) (0.2973) (0.3407) (0.3347) 
Share of sales abroad –0.2006 –0.1306 –0.2152 –0.2153 
(0.1394) (0.1110) (0.1266) (0.1291) 
Parent weighted GDP 0.6569 0.5606 0.8638 0.6961 
 growth rate × share of (0.5300) (0.4230) (0.4798) (0.4859) 
 sales abroad
 
Period/Industry Y Y Y Y 
 fixed effects?
Observations 2,774 3,049 2,777 2,769 
r2 0.0726 0.0917 0.0754 0.0509 
notes: The dependent variables are foreign growth rates of net property, plant and equipment (PPE) (column 1), 
assets (column 2), employment compensation (column 3), and employment (column 4). Foreign growth rates are 
ratios of changes in activity between benchmark years to averages of the beginning and end of period values. 
Parent weighted GDP growth rates are the weighted changes, between benchmark periods, in GDP per capita of 
affiliate host countries, divided by averages of beginning and end of period values. Values of real GDP per cap-
ita in current prices are taken from Heston, Summers, and Aten (2006). Country weights used for each parent 
company equal beginning of period net PPE levels in each country. Share of sales abroad is measured as of the 
beginning of each period, and it is computed by aggregating sales by each affiliate to persons outside of the affili-
ate's host country and dividing by total affiliate sales. All regressions are OLS specifications that include period/
industry fixed effects. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors that correct for clustering at the parent level 
appear in parentheses. 
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capital and labor demand. All specifications include complete sets of period-industry 
fixed effects for two-digit parent industries in each period, and the standard errors 
allow for clustering at the parent level. The 0.2578 coefficient in column 1 of Table 
5 indicates that 10 percent greater accumulation of foreign property and plant and 
equipment, as predicted by host country GDP growth, is associated with 2.6 percent 
growth of domestic net property and plant and equipment. This estimated effect is 
quite similar to that implied by the OLS regression reported in column 1 of Table 
2. The 0.2387 coefficient in column 2 indicates that 10 percent greater foreign asset 
accumulation is associated with 2.4 percent growth of domestic assets, though this 
effect is of marginal statistical significance. There is no indication that firms accu-
mulating capital assets in their foreign affiliates do so at the expense of domestic 
capital accumulation. Instead, greater use of foreign capital appears to stimulate 
greater use of domestic capital.
The dependent variable in the regression reported in column 3 of Table 5 is the 
growth rate of domestic employee compensation. The 0.3692 coefficient indicates 
that greater total foreign labor compensation is associated with greater demand for 
domestic labor. This estimated effect is somewhat larger than that implied by the 
Table 5—Effects of Foreign Factors on Domestic Factor Demand: IV Specifications 
Dependent variable:











(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant 1.0018 0.5452 0.1754 –0.0131 
(0.0181) (0.0292) (0.0746) (0.0052) 
Foreign net PPE growth 0.2578 
(0.1184) 
Foreign asset growth 0.2387 
(0.1260) 
Foreign employment 0.3692 
 compensation growth (0.1456) 
Foreign employment 0.6550 
 growth (0.2771) 
IV with parent weighted Y Y Y Y
 GDP growth? 
Period/industry fixed effects? Y Y Y Y 
Observations 2,844 3,137 2,842 2,834 
notes: The dependent variables are domestic growth rates of net property, and plant and equipment (PPE) (col-
umn 1), assets (column 2), employment compensation (column 3), and employment (column 4). Independent vari-
ables are corresponding foreign growth rates. Domestic and foreign growth rates are defined as ratios of changes 
in activity between benchmark years to averages of the beginning and end of period values. All regressions are 
IV specifications in which parent weighed GDP growth rates are used as instruments for foreign growth rates. 
These instruments are calculated by first computing GDP growth rates measured as the change in host country 
GDP per capita in between benchmark years scaled by average GDP per capita at the beginning and end of the 
period. Values of real GDP per capita in current prices are taken from Heston, Summers, and Aten (2006). These 
GDP growth rates are then weighted using weights equal to the beginning of period net PPE in each country. All 
specifications include period/industry fixed effects. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors that correct for 
clustering at the parent level appear in parentheses. 
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0.2454 OLS coefficient presented in column 3 of Table 2, though the two are sta-
tistically indistinguishable. Similarly, the 0.6550 coefficient in column 4 of Table 5 
implies that greater foreign employment is associated with greater domestic employ-
ment.15 Further regressions (not reported) indicate that growth-induced changes in 
foreign employment compensation per employee are unrelated to changes in domes-
tic employment compensation per employee. This evidence is consistent with a model 
of complementarity in which foreign employment compensation affects domestic 
employment compensation through changes in employment levels and not through 
changes in compensation per employee.
C. Sources of Domestic Growth
There are several channels through which foreign activities can influence the 
scope of domestic operations, including cases in which foreign production requires 
inputs of tangible or intellectual property produced in the home country. The regres-
sions presented in Table 6 consider the effects of greater foreign sales on domestic 
R&D and domestic exports to affiliates located abroad. Columns 1 and 2 report esti-
mated coefficients from regressions in which the dependent variable is the change in 
domestic R&D.16 The 0.3225 estimated coefficient in the OLS regression reported in 
column one indicates that 10 percent faster foreign sales growth is associated with 
3.2 percent more rapid growth of domestic R&D spending. In order to avoid bias 
that might arise due to the joint determination of domestic R&D growth and foreign 
affiliate sales growth, the specification in column 2 instruments for foreign sales 
growth using foreign GDP growth rates.17 The 0.4991 estimated coefficient in this 
specification implies a slightly larger effect, 10 percent faster foreign sales growth 
being associated with 5.0 percent greater domestic R&D spending. Since foreign 
operations stand to benefit from intangible assets developed by R&D spending, it is 
not surprising that greater foreign investment might stimulate additional spending 
on R&D in the United States.
Columns 3 and 4 report estimated coefficients from regressions in which the 
dependent variable is the growth in a parent company’s exports to its affiliates. The 
estimated 0.6642 coefficient reported in column 3 indicates that 10 percent higher 
growth of foreign sales is associated with 6.6 percent greater exports from US parent 
companies to their foreign affiliates. The corresponding instrumental variables coef-
ficient of 0.6473, reported in column 4, indicates that firms whose initial investments 
were concentrated in economies that subsequently grew rapidly tend to expand their 
exports from the United States to affiliates abroad. These results are consistent with 
15 Reliable inference from instrumental variables estimation requires strong first-stage instruments. The J. G. 
Cragg and S. G. Donald (1993) statistics for the instruments used in columns 1–4 are, respectively, 37.27, 37.61, 
28.58, and 9.58. Critical values computed in James H. Stock and Motohiro Yogo (2005) imply that conventional 
5 percent level Wald tests based on IV statistics have actual sizes that exceed thresholds of 10 percent for the first 
three specifications and 15 percent for the fourth. Consequently, there is no evidence of critical weakness in the 
first-stage instruments.
16 Growth rates that serve as dependent variables in Table 6 are computed in the same way as other growth 
rates. They are ratios of changes between benchmark years to averages of beginning and end of period values. 
17 The first-stage results of this IV specification and the one presented in column 4 indicate that Parent 
Weighted GDP Growth Rates are significant in predicting foreign sales growth rates.
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those presented in Table 5, in which domestic investment and employment growth 
respond positively to changes in their foreign counterparts.
D. robustness checks
As noted earlier, scenarios exist that raise potential questions about the validity 
of the instrument. For example, firms with considerable foreign direct investment in 
a country might also export significant amounts of its final product from the US to 
unaffiliated customers in the same country. If this were the case, local GDP growth 
would be an invalid instrument, since high foreign economic growth would directly 
stimulate domestic investment to meet US export demand. The first two regressions 
presented in Table 7 address this possibility by including, as an independent variable, 
a measure of foreign GDP growth weighted by beginning of period firm exports to 
unrelated parties, constructed from BEA data that identify the destination of each 
firm’s US exports to unrelated parties.18 It is also possible that real exchange rate 
movements that are associated with differences in GDP growth rates might influence 
relative prices in a way that directly affects factor demands by multinational firms. 
The first two regressions of Table 7 also address this concern by including measures 
18 In each of the first stages of the specifications presented in Table 7, parent weighted GDP growth rates are 
significant in explaining growth in foreign activity.
Table 6—Foreign Growth, Domestic R&D, and Domestic Exports 
Dependent variable: Parent R&D growth Growth of parent exports to affiliates
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant 1.1877 1.0017 –0.1009 1.7494 
(0.0335) (0.2439) (0.2328) (0.0911) 
Foreign sales growth 0.3225 0.4991 0.6642 0.6473 
(0.0318) (0.2316) (0.0373) (0.2525) 
IV with parent N Y N Y 
 weighted GDP 
 growth?
Period/industry Y Y Y Y 
 fixed effects?
Observations 2,616 2,616 2,140 2,140 
r2 0.1145 0.2184 
notes: The dependent variables are the growth rate of parent R&D expenditures (columns 1 and 2) and par-
ent exports to affiliates (columns 3 and 4). Growth rates are computed by taking ratios of changes in measures 
in between benchmark years to average values of measures at the beginning and end of the period. The regres-
sions in columns 1 and 3 are OLS specifications, and the regressions in columns 2 and 4 are IV specifications. 
Weighed measures of host-country GDP growth are used as instruments for foreign affiliate sales growth in col-
umns 2 and 4. Instruments are calculated by first computing GDP growth rates measured as changes in host coun-
try GDP per capita between benchmark years scaled by average GDP per capita at the beginning and end of the 
period. Values of real GDP per capita in current prices are taken from Heston, Summers, and Aten (2006). These 
GDP growth rates are then weighted using weights equal to the beginning of period net PPE in each country. All 
specifications include period/industry fixed effects. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors that correct for 
clustering at the parent level appear in parentheses. 
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of real exchange rate changes weighted by a firm’s distribution of property and plant 
and equipment at the beginning of each period.
Since not all parents are exporters, the use of trade share data reduces sample sizes 
somewhat, but, as the regressions reported in columns 1 and 2 of Table 7 illustrate, 
the inclusion of trade-weighted GDP growth rates and exchange rates has very little 
impact on the estimated effects of foreign capital accumulation and employment 
compensation growth. Ten percent faster foreign capital accumulation is associated 
with 2.7 percent faster domestic capital accumulation in the regression reported in 
Table 7—Introducing Controls for Trade Patterns and Exchange Rates,  
and an Alternative Instrument 
Dependent variable:












(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant 0.3898 0.3085 1.0029 0.1654 
(0.1649) (0.0459) (0.0181) (0.0702) 
Foreign net PPE growth 0.2656 0.2503 
(0.1368) (0.1184) 
Foreign employment 0.3343 0.3888 
 compensation growth (0.1577) (0.1372) 
GDP growth weighted –0.1212 –0.1474 
 by parent trade (0.1381) (0.1391) 
Change in real 0.0289 0.0340 
 exchange rate (0.0512) (0.0469)
 
IV with parent weighted Y Y N N 
 GDP growth?
IV with parent weighted N N Y Y 
 GDP growth residuals?
Period/industry Y Y Y Y 
 fixed effects?
Observations 2,309 2,306 2,844 2,842 
notes: The dependent variable in columns 1 and 3 is growth of domestic property, plant and equipment (PPE), and 
the dependent variable in columns 2 and 4 is growth of domestic employment compensation. Domestic and foreign 
growth rates are defined as ratios of changes in activity between benchmark years to averages of the beginning 
and end of period values. Changes in real exchange rates are weighted changes. A change is measured as the ratio 
of the change of the real exchange rate to the average of the real exchange rates at the beginning and end of the 
period. The weights correspond to the distribution of beginning of period PPE. Real exchange rates are computed 
using nominal exchange rates taken from Heston, Summers, and Aten (2006), and inflation is drawn from the IMF 
International Financial Statistics database. GDP Growth Weighted by Parent Trade is the weighted average of GDP 
growth rates, computed using weights equal to beginning of period parent exports to unrelated parties in a country. 
Values of per capita GDP are taken from Heston, Summers, and Aten (2006). All regressions are IV specifications. 
Instrumental variables are calculated by first computing GDP growth rates measured as the change in host country 
GDP per capita between benchmark years scaled by average GDP per capita at the beginning and end of the period. 
Instruments in columns 1 and 2 weight host country GDP by beginning of period net PPE in each country. Instruments 
in columns 3 and 4 equal residuals from regressions of GDP growth rates on its own lag, with these residuals then 
weighted by beginning of period PPE in each country. All specifications include period/industry fixed effects. 
Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors that correct for clustering at the parent level appear in parentheses. 
   
198 AmEricAn Economic JoUrnAL: Economic PoLicy FEBrUAry 2009
column 1, and 10 percent faster foreign employment compensation growth is asso-
ciated with 3.3 percent faster domestic employment compensation growth in the 
regression reported in column 2. The estimated direct effects of trade-weighted for-
eign GDP growth and exchange rate movements are negligible in both regressions.
If firms with rapidly growing domestic activities choose to locate their foreign 
operations in relatively high-growth economies, the results in Table 5 may not 
accurately reflect the influence of higher foreign growth rates on domestic fac-
tor demands. In order to evaluate this possibility, the regressions presented in the 
columns 3 and 4 of Table 7 use measures of unexpected host country growth as 
instruments. Specifically, these instruments are computed by taking residuals from 
a regression of GDP growth on its own lag, then weighting these residuals using 
firm-specific weights that correspond to beginning of period levels of net property 
and plant and equipment. The regressions reported in columns 3 and 4 of Table 7 are 
run on the same sample as that used in the regressions reported in columns 1 and 3 
of Table 5, and the estimated coefficients are quite similar (0.2503 and 0.2578 in the 
case of property, plant and equipment; 0.3888 and 0.3692 in the case of employment 
compensation), suggesting that it is the unpredictable component of GDP growth 
that is responsible for the results appearing in Table 5. An additional predictor of 
GDP growth is available for 1999, when the IMF published two-year growth pre-
dictions for a large number of countries. Computing instruments by first regressing 
GDP growth on its own lag and, when available, IMF growth projections, and then 
weighting residuals by beginning of period net PPE in each country changes the 
estimates very little.
The merger and acquisition activities of multinational firms raise the possibility 
that the estimated impact of foreign investment on domestic investment might reflect 
what happens when one US multinational firm buys another, thereby simultaneously 
acquiring the target’s domestic and foreign assets. If this acquisition activity is most 
prevalent among firms with foreign affiliates located in high-growth countries, then 
it could be responsible for the pattern that is apparent in the data. In such cases the 
estimated effect of foreign investment on domestic investment may offer a mislead-
ing picture of changes in factor demands, since acquisitions may entail purchasing 
bundles of foreign and domestic assets that are not what the acquirer would other-
wise desire. The regressions presented in columns 1–4 of Table 8 address this poten-
tial problem by removing from the sample observations of parent companies that 
acquire other US parent companies or divisions of other parents.19 Columns 1 and 
2 of Table 8 present OLS specifications of regressions run on the restricted sample 
of firms. Estimated coefficients on foreign net PPE growth and foreign employment 
compensation growth are similar to those obtained from regressions using the whole 
sample and presented in columns 1 and 3 of Table 2. Estimated effects of foreign 
changes on domestic activity in the instrumental variable regressions presented in 
columns 3 and 4 of Table 8 are likewise similar to those presented in columns 1 and 
3 of Table 5. Although the 0.1419  coefficient in column 3 is insignificant, it implies 
that 10 percent foreign investment is associated with 1.4 percent greater domestic 
19 The BEA data identify purchases of one US multinational firm by another and purchases of foreign affili-
ates previously owned by another firm in the BEA data.
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investment. The 0.3023 coefficient in column 4 implies that 10 percent foreign wage 
growth is associated with 3 percent greater domestic employment compensation 
growth.
In a related vein, reported estimates do not capture the effect of a domestic firm’s 
initial expansion in markets abroad. Since the IV estimation method requires the 
use of beginning of period values of foreign activity, it is not possible to construct 
an instrument for new foreign investment by firms without prior foreign exposure. 
Firms initiating activity abroad are responsible for only a small fraction of aggregate 
foreign investment, so their effect is unlikely to dominate the total responsiveness 
of domestic investment to foreign activities.20 It is also possible to analyze a subset 
of observations representing the first period following a firm’s foreign entry. The 
20 See Appendix table 1 in Desai, Foley, and Hines (2005b) for data on the magnitude of entry relative to the 
magnitude of growth of existing firms in the BEA data. The BEA data also allow one to consider the effects of 
introducing an affiliate on exports from the parent. It is possible to measure average changes in parent exports 
to unaffiliated foreign persons in a particular country during the period that a new affiliate appears in that coun-
try. During such periods, parent company exports appear to increase. The average change in unaffiliated parent 
company trade, measured as the change in unaffiliated parent trade scaled by the average of beginning and end of 
period unaffiliated trade, is 12.3 percent.






























(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Constant 0.2828 0.0320 0.2967 0.0075 –0.0715 0.2964 –0.1337 –0.0435 
(0.0240) (0.0220) (0.0408) (0.0375) (0.0551) (0.0471) (0.0759) (0.0940) 
Foreign net 0.1944 0.1419 0.1679 0.5164 
 PPE growth (0.0164) (0.1118) (0.0318) (0.4770) 
Foreign employment 0.2318 0.3023 0.1911 0.6393 
 compensation growth (0.0164) (0.1286) (0.0286) (0.2984) 
IV with Parent  
 weighted GDP growth?
N N Y Y N N Y Y
Period fixed effects? Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Drop acquirers? Y Y Y Y N N N N 
Focus on  
 new entrants?
N N N N Y Y Y Y 
Observations 2,469 2,480 2,368 2,367 605 611 570 569 
r2 0.6798 0.1307  0.3983 0.1043
notes: The dependent variables are domestic growth rates of net property and plant and equipment (PPE) (col-
umns 1, 3, 5, and 7) and growth of domestic employment compensation (columns 2, 4, 6, and 8). Domestic and 
foreign growth rates are ratios of changes in activity between benchmark years to averages of beginning and end 
of period values. The regressions in columns 1, 2, 5, and 6 are OLS specifications and the regressions in columns 
3, 4, 7, and 8 are IV specifications. Parent weighted GDP growth rates are used as instruments for foreign growth 
rates.  Instrumental variables are calculated by first computing GDP growth rates measured as the change in host 
country GDP per capita between benchmark years scaled by average GDP per capita at the beginning and end of 
the period.  Values of real GDP per capita in current prices are taken from Heston, Summers, and Aten (2006). 
These GDP growth rates are then weighted using weights equal to the beginning of period net PPE in each coun-
try. The sample is restricted to nonacquirers in columns 1–4 and to new entrants in columns 5–8. All specifica-
tions include period fixed effects. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors that correct for clustering at the 
parent level appear in parentheses. 
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 regressions presented in columns 5–8 of Table 7 are run on this subsample of observa-
tions. Sample sizes are, necessarily, very small (between 569 and 611). Nonetheless, 
the OLS results in columns 5 and 6 are similar to those reported in columns 1 and 2 
of the same table for the considerably larger sample of firms that do not merge. Point 
estimates of the effects of foreign investment and foreign employment compensation 
growth are larger in the IV specifications reported in columns 7 and 8, and only the 
effects of foreign employment compensation growth are significant, owing to the 
small sample sizes.21 Thus, there is no indication that foreign expansion is associated 
with domestic contraction soon after firms initiate foreign activity.22
Although the main specifications presented include fixed effects for each two-digit 
industry in each year, there is potential value in using more detailed industry classifi-
cations. Some countries may be dominated by small numbers of industries in which 
firms experience common shocks that affect their foreign and domestic activities. 
In such cases, the foreign and domestic investments of the firms, and the GDPs of 
the countries in which they invest, would all be positively correlated. Alternatively, 
large movements in certain commodity prices could affect domestic and foreign 
activity in particular industries and be correlated with the growth of economies that 
are host countries of US affiliates in these industries. In order to assess the possibil-
ity that these phenomena are important enough to drive the results, additional tests 
(not reported) include fixed effects specific to each three-digit parent industry for 
each time period in the data.23 The estimated coefficients are, again, very similar to 
those reported in Table 5. To ensure that outliers or large firms do not drive the main 
results, the specifications presented in Table 5 have been run as quantile regressions, 
and they have been run using a sample that excludes the largest 5 percent of the firms 
in the sample, as measured by total start of period foreign property and plant and 
equipment. The results are, likewise, very similar to those reported in Table 5.
E. General Equilibrium considerations
These estimated effects of foreign operations on domestic sales and factor demands 
are identified by differences between firms in the growth rates of the foreign econo-
mies in which they invest, which in turn affect the rates at which firms expand 
their foreign investments. As a result, the estimates are cross sectional in nature. 
They reflect comparisons of the subsequent domestic activities of firms that invested 
in certain foreign countries with firms that invested in others. The total domestic 
effects of policies affecting foreign investment include price changes that affect all 
firms and are not reflected in cross-sectional comparisons of some firms with others. 
21 The first stages of the specifications presented in columns 3, 4, and 8 of Table 8 indicate that parent weighted 
GDP growth rates are significant in explaining measures of foreign activity growth. The instrument is positive, 
but not significant in the first stage of the specification in column 7, perhaps as a consequence of the small sample 
size.
22 Selection issues could also obscure the results if firms expand domestically when they cease to operate 
abroad. Because the data do not include detailed information about why firms leave the sample and do not track 
firms when they terminate their foreign activity, this concern cannot be easily addressed. As it happens, not 
many firms exit the sample, and those that do tend to be small, so they are unlikely to have major effects on the 
estimated coefficients. 
23 There are 101 two-digit industry/year fixed effects but 302 three-digit industry/year fixed effects.
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These general equilibrium considerations include changes in output prices of indus-
tries with significant foreign exposure, any endogenous effects on interest rates, 
exchange rates, wages, prices of investment goods, and others. These endogenous 
price changes are likely to attenuate, but not reverse in sign, the estimated firm-level 
effects of foreign operations on domestic capital accumulation, employment, R&D 
spending, and exports. In the absence of a complete general equilibrium analysis, it 
is difficult to estimate the aggregate magnitudes of these effects on the US economy, 
but there is, nonetheless, a presumption that the signs of aggregate effects resemble 
those estimated on the basis of firm-level evidence.
IV. Conclusion
Manufacturing firms that expanded their foreign operations between 1982 and 
2004 simultaneously expanded their domestic operations, and this relationship 
persists when actual foreign expansions are replaced by predicted values based on 
weighted growth rates of foreign economies. Foreign investment that is triggered by 
foreign economic growth is associated with growing domestic capital accumulation, 
employment compensation, R&D, and exports to related parties. These results run 
counter to the simple intuition that foreign direct investment diverts domestic eco-
nomic activity by firms undertaking the foreign investment. This intuition is based 
on the notion that each firm has a fixed amount of global production, so any addi-
tional foreign production comes at the cost of reduced domestic production. Neither 
firms nor economies operate on such a zero-sum basis, and the average experience 
of US manufacturing firms over the last two decades is inconsistent with the simple 
story that foreign expansions come at the cost of reduced domestic activity.
These results carry implications for US policies that influence levels of foreign 
investment by US companies. The United States taxes the foreign incomes of US 
firms, permitting taxpayers to claim tax credits for foreign income tax payments 
and to defer US taxation of certain unrepatriated profits of foreign subsidiaries. A 
system of taxing foreign income while providing foreign tax credits is commonly 
justified by appeal to the principle of capital export neutrality, itself predicated on 
the intuition that foreign investment reduces domestic investment on a one-for-one 
basis.24 The evidence that domestic manufacturing activity does not appear to fall in 
response to increased foreign investment spurred by foreign economic growth sug-
gests that these principles and the policies they support are ripe for reconsideration. 
If foreign and domestic investment are not substitutes, then it becomes more attrac-
tive to exempt active foreign business income from domestic taxation, particularly 
given the benefits of improving asset ownership allocation by having a tax system 
that satisfies capital ownership neutrality (Desai and Hines, 2003). Furthermore, this 
evidence suggests that encouraging foreign policy makers to liberalize their markets 
would benefit domestic firms and workers.
Public fears over the possible offshoring of economic activity have added force 
to policy proposals that, if enacted, would limit the foreign activities of US firms. 
24 The standard international tax theory is developed in Peggy B. Musgrave (1969) and Thomas Horst (1980) 
and reviewed by Gordon and Hines (2002).
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Recent proposals include those providing specific incentives for firms that increase 
domestic employment relative to foreign employment, and others applying US labor 
and environmental regulations to activities in foreign countries. Whatever their mer-
its, adoption of these reforms would very likely constrain foreign activity by US 
firms. The evidence provided in this paper suggests that these initiatives may also 
have the unintended effect of reducing domestic activity by the same firms.
REFERENCES
Antràs, Pol. 2003. “Firms, Contracts, and Trade Structure.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118(4): 
1375–1418.
Antràs, Pol, and Elhanan Helpman. 2004. “Global Sourcing.” Journal of Political Economy, 112(3): 
552–80.
Arndt, Christian, Claudia M. Buch, and Monika Schnitzer. 2007. “FDI and Domestic Investment: An 
Industry-Level View.” University of Munich Discussion Paper 212.
Blonigen, Bruce A. 2001. “In Search of Substitution between Foreign Production and Exports.” Jour-
nal of international Economics, 53(1): 81–104.
Blonigen, Bruce A., and Wesley W. Wilson. 1999. “Explaining Armington: What Determines Substi-
tutability Between Home and Foreign Goods.” canadian Journal of Economics, 32(1): 1–21.
Brainard, S. Lael, and David A. Riker. 1997. “Are U.S. Multinationals Exporting Jobs?” National 
Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 5958.
Cragg, J. G., and S. G. Donald. 1993. “Testing Identifiability and Specification in Instrumental Vari-
able Models.” Economic Theory, 9(2): 222–40.
Davis, Steven J., R. Jason Faberman, and John Haltiwanger. 2006. “The Flow Approach to Labor 
Markets: New Data Sources and Micro-Macro Links.” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 20(3): 
3–26.
Davis, Steven J., John C. Haltiwanger, and Scott Schuh. 1996. Job creation and Destruction. Cam-
bridge, MA: MIT Press.
Desai, Mihir A., C. Fritz Foley, and James R. Hines Jr. 2004. “The Costs of Shared Ownership: Evi-
dence from International Joint Ventures.” Journal of Financial Economics, 73(2): 323–74.
Desai, Mihir A., C. Fritz Foley, and James R. Hines Jr. 2005a. “Foreign Direct Investment and the 
Domestic Capital Stock.” American Economic review, 95(2): 33–38.
Desai, Mihir A., C. Fritz Foley, and James R. Hines Jr. 2005b. “Foreign Direct Investment and 
Domestic Economic Activity.” National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 11717.
Desai, Mihir A., and James R. Hines Jr. 2003. “Evaluating International Tax Reform.” national Tax 
Journal, 56(3): 487–502.
Devereux, Michael P., and Harold Freeman. 1995. “The Impact of Tax on Foreign Direct Investment: 
Empirical Evidence and the Implications for Tax Integration Schemes.” international Tax and 
Public Finance, 2(1): 85–106.
Faeth, Isabel. 2006. “Consequences of FDI in Australia—Causal Links between FDI, Domestic 
Investment, Economic Growth and Trade.” University of Melbourne Department of Economics 
Working Paper 977.
Feenstra, Robert C., and Gordon H. Hanson. 1996. “Globalization, Outsourcing and Wage Inequal-
ity.” American Economic review, 86(2): 240–45.
Feenstra, Robert C., and Gordon H. Hanson. 1999. “The Impact of Outsourcing and High- Technology 
Capital on Wages: Estimates for the United States, 1979–1990.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
114(3): 907–40.
Feenstra, Robert C., and Gordon H. Hanson. 2005. “Ownership and Control in Outsourcing to 
China: Estimating the Property-Rights Theory of the Firm.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
120(2): 729–61.
Feldstein, Martin. 1995. “The Effects of Outbound Foreign Direct Investment on the Domestic Capi-
tal Stock.” In The Effects of Taxation on multinational corporations, ed. Martin Feldstein, James 
R. Hines, Jr., and R. Glenn Hubbard, 43–63. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Gordon, Roger H., and James R. Hines Jr. 2002. “International Taxation.” In Handbook of Public 
Economics, Vol. 4, ed. Alan J. Auerbach and Martin Feldstein, 1935–95. Amsterdam: North Hol-
land.
Hanson, Gordon H., Raymond J. Mataloni, Jr., and Matthew J. Slaughter. 2005. “Vertical Produc-
tion Networks in Multinational Firms.” review of Economics and Statistics, 87(4): 664–78.
VoL. 1 no. 1 203DESAi ET AL.: DomESTic EFFEcTS oF FDi
Harrison, Ann E., and Margaret S. McMillan. 2004. “The Impact of Overseas Investment 
by US Multinationals on Wages and Employment.” http://www.aeaweb.org/annual_mtg_
papers/2005/0108_1430_0402.pdf.
Hejazi, Walid, and P. Pauly. 2003. “Motivations for FDI and Domestic Capital Formation.” Journal 
of international Business Studies, 34(3): 282–89.
Helpman, Elhanan. 1984. “A Simple Theory of International Trade with Multinational Corporations.” 
Journal of Political Economy, 92(3): 451–71.
Helpman, Elhanan, Mark J. Melitz, and Stephen R. Yeaple. 2004. “Export versus FDI with Hetero-
geneous Firms.” American Economic review, 94(1): 300–316.
Heston, Alan, Robert Summers, and Bettina Aten. 2006. “Penn World Table Version 6.2.” Center for 
International Comparisons of Production, Income and Prices at the University of Pennsylvania 
(CICUP). http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/php_site/pwt62/pwt62_form.php.
Hines Jr., James R. 2005. “Do Tax Havens Flourish?” In Tax Policy and the Economy, Vol. 19, ed. 
James M. Poterba, 65–99. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Horst, Thomas. 1980. “A Note on the Optimal Taxation of International Investment Income.” Quar-
terly Journal of Economics, 94(4): 793–98.
Hummels, David, Jun Ishii, and Kei-Mu Yi. 2001. “The Nature and Growth of Vertical Specialization 
in World Trade.” Journal of international Economics, 54(1): 75–96.
Kleinert, Jörn, and Farid Toubal. 2007. “The Impact of Locating Production Abroad on Activities at 
Home: Evidence from German Firm-Level Data.” University of Tübingen Research Paper 314.
Lipsey, Robert E. 1995. “Outward Direct Investment and the U.S. Economy.” In The Effects of Taxa-
tion on multinational corporations, ed. Martin Feldstein, James R. Hines, Jr., and R. Glenn Hub-
bard, 7–33. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Markusen, James R. 1984. “Multinational Firms, Multi-plant Economies and Gains from Trade.” 
Journal of international Economics, 16(3): 205–26.
Markusen, James R. 2002. multinational Firms and the Theory of international Trade. Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press.
Musgrave, Peggy B. 1969. United States Taxation of Foreign investment income: issues and Argu-
ments. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Harvard School of Law.
Riker, David A., and S. Lael Brainard. 1997. “US Multinationals and Competition from Low Wage 
Countries.” National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 5959.
Slaughter, Matthew J. 2000. “Production Transfer within Multinational Enterprises and American 
Wages.” Journal of international Economics, 50(2): 449–72.
Stevens, Guy V. G., and Robert E. Lipsey. 1992. “Interactions between Domestic and Foreign Invest-
ment.” Journal of international money and Finance, 11(1): 40–62.
Stock, James H., and Motohiro Yogo. 2005. “Testing for Weak Instruments in Linear IV Regression.” 
In identification and inference for Econometric models: Essays in Honor of Thomas rothenberg, 
ed. D. W. K. Andrews and J. H. Stock, 80–108. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Törnqvist, Leo, Pentti Vartia, and Yrjö O. Vartia. 1985. “How Should Relative Changes Be Mea-
sured?” The American Statistician, 39(1): 43–46.
Yi, Kei-Mu. 2003. “Can Vertical Specialization Explain the Growth of World Trade?” Journal of 
Political Economy, 111(1): 52–102.
